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ABSTRACT 
The Internet Protocol (IP) has been proven very flexible, being 
able to accommodate all kinds of link technologies and supporting 
a broad range of applications. The basic principles of the original 
Internet architecture include end-to-end addressing, global route-
ability and a single namespace of IP addresses that unintentionally 
serves both as locators and host identifiers. The commercial suc-
cess and widespread use of the Internet have lead to new require-
ments, which include internetworking over business boundaries, 
mobility and multi-homing in an untrusted environment. Our ap-
proach to satisfy these new requirements is to introduce a new 
internetworking layer, the node identity layer. Such a layer runs 
on top of the different versions of IP, but could also run directly 
on top of other kinds of network technologies, such as MPLS and 
2G/3G PDP contexts. This approach enables connectivity across 
different communication technologies, supports mobility, multi-
homing, and security from ground up. This paper describes the 
Node Identity Architecture in detail and discusses the experiences 
from implementing and running a prototype. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
C.2.2 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network Proto-
cols – protocol architecture, protocol verification 
Keywords 
Communication systems, Future Internet, mobile communication, 
Internet Architecture. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The basic principles of the original Internet architecture in-
clude end-to-end addressing, global routeability and a single ad-
dress space of IP addresses that act as locators and node identifi-
ers at the same time. These principles are suitable for static and 
well-managed network hierarchies. However, since the Internet 
has evolved from a small research network to a worldwide infor-
mation exchange network, a growing diversity of commercial, 
social, ethnic, and governmental interests have led to increasingly 
conflicting requirements among the competing stakeholders. 
These conflicts create tensions that the original Internet architec-
ture struggles to withstand.  
The commercial success and widespread use of the Internet 
have lead to new requirements for a future Internet, which include 
internetworking over business boundaries, mobility, multi-
homing, and security for untrusted environments. Concurrently 
with this research into new internetworking architectures, a de-
mand for private, autonomous networks is growing. Although still 
connected to the global Internet, these autonomous networks offer 
local features and capabilities that are independent from the public 
Internet. The today’s solution to achieve more autonomy are Net-
work Address Translators (NAT) [11], which is a popular method 
for reusing address space and decoupling routing in the private 
network from routing in the public Internet. Although these capa-
bilities of NATs mitigate many immediate problems, NATs are 
not a clean solution [12].  
The fundamental problems of the Internet Protocol stems 
from overloading two separate functionalities onto the same bit 
string of the IP address. One is its use as a locator, i.e., as an ad-
dress that denotes a location in the topology of the network and 
specifies a network attachment point (interface). The second one 
is that of an identifier that describes the identity of a node.  
The problem with the NAT approach is that it translates be-
tween internal and external addresses and with that also implicitly 
translates between the associated identities. This causes applica-
tions and protocols that exchange IP addresses in their payloads, 
such as FTP, to break.  
The problem with addressing a network attachment point is 
that today most hosts have more than one communication capabil-
ity, and with it the possibility to attach to the network through 
several interfaces. This multi-homing causes the host to show up 
with multiple interface addresses, and thus multiple identities. 
Furthermore, the Internet is an untrusted network, and more em-
phasis is required to secure the communication across the net-
work. 
Finally, designing and implementing a new Internetworking 
architecture always poses the question on the feasibility of deploy-
ing it globally. Therefore, measures must be taken to design for 
gradual deployment, such that early adopters benefit, without 
others having to migrate. Also the changes to the network re-
quired, should be limited and management of the network should 
be minimal. Finally, the architecture needs to scale up to global 
deployment. 
The Node Identity Internetworking Architecture [1][2] is de-
signed to address the above described challenges architecturally, 
and not as an after thought or patch of the today’s Internet. Its key 
characteristics are the separation of a node's identity from its loca-
tion, and the notion of locator domains. Multiple locator domains, 
which may use different technology, addressing and/or routing 
schemes, are intrinsically supported, where at locator domain 
borders a process similar to twice-NAT is performed. Mobility 
and host multi-homing are supported by decoupling the Node 
Identity from the topological meaning of the addresses. Finally, 
security is built-in through the usage of cryptographic Node Iden-
tities. 
This paper describes the Node Identity Architecture in detail 
and discusses the experiences from implementing a prototype. The 
remainder of this document is organized as follows. In section 2 
we describe the Node Identity Architecture including assump-
tions, principles and key features. Section 3 introduces some spe-
cific implementation options and section 4 presents the prototype 
implementation used for the experimental evaluation and its re-
sults. A discussion on the proposed architecture is provided in 
section 5. Section 6 presents some related work and the differ-
ences to the Node Identity Architecture. Finally, the paper is con-
cluded in section 7. 
2. NODE IDENTITY ARCHITECTURE 
2.1 Assumptions and Principles 
The Node Identity Internetworking Architecture, NodeID in 
short, is based on two main ideas. The first idea is the notion of a 
node identity layer directly on top of existing networking technol-
ogy. This layer provides unique cryptographic identifiers for 
nodes, called node identities (NIDs), which are independent of the 
node’s current location and network address. The second idea is 
to perform routing in the node identity layer using the node identi-
fiers with the purpose of providing mobility and multi-homing, as 
well as bridging heterogeneous address domains. The first of these 
ideas is shared with HIP, the Host Identity Protocol architecture 
[4]. 
The NID is the public part of a randomly self-generated pub-
lic/private key pair. This allows the use of the NID for authentica-
tion purposes between nodes (not between users). The NID is 
from a flat identifier space without topological semantics, that is, 
it has no location information within the network topology. In 
addition, a node has one or several locators. In contrast to the 
NID, the locators usually have topological semantics, but that 
depends on the specifics of the networking technology in use. The 
locator is used to route messages to a node within its network. It 
can be e.g. an IPv4 or IPv6 address. The locators of a node may 
be assigned to one or multiple interfaces and can be of different 
kinds. 
The architecture defines two basic components: locator do-
main (LD) and node identity router (NR). A locator domain is the 
abstraction of a network having a consistent internal addressing 
and routing system. Nodes within one LD can freely communi-
cate, only relying on internal services of the respective LD. Dif-
ferent LDs may employ different networking technologies, in 
particular IPv4, IPv6, global and private address spaces, MAC 
addresses, or any other technology-specific addressing like 2G 
and 3G PDP contexts or MPLS. This implies that an LD boundary 
may also be a network technology boundary. The Node Identity 
Internetworking architecture does not aim to unify the global net-
work into a single, globally deployed networking technology, but 
accepts or even encourages the existence of different networking 
domains. E.g. the global IPv4 network can be seen as one LD, 
while private, NAT'ed networks can be seen as separate LDs. The 
concept is deliberately flexible in that an LD border can be de-
fined even when there is no technology or addressing border re-
quiring one. 
The locator domains are interconnected by node identity 
routers (NID routers, or just NRs for short). NID routers forward 
packets using a NID routing table, similar to how IP routers for-
ward packets using an IP routing table.  
Connectivity between locator domains is assumed to be dy-
namic, especially in the edge of the global topology. That is, the 
existence and characteristics of connectivity between two locator 
domains, and between nodes and locator domains, may change 
dynamically on relatively short timescales, due to routing changes, 
mobility and multi-homing events, or provider change of nodes or 
networks. 
2.2 NodeID Routing 
Routing within the Node Identity Internetworking Architec-
ture follows a two-level approach: 
1. Intra-LD: Routing between nodes within an LD is solely 
based on the internal routing scheme of the respective 
LD using the locators. Each LD can therefore have a 
different routing scheme. Note that one node can belong 
to more than one LD if it has more than one locator. A 
locator within one LD has absolutely no meaning within 
another LD. As a consequence, overlapping loca-
tor/address spaces are a non-issue and locators do not 
need to be globally managed. They only need to be 
unique within a single LD. 
2. Inter-LD: Routing across LD borders is based on the 
NID of the node, or more precisely on a fixed-length 
hash of its NID – the NID Forwarding Tag (NIFT). 
Intra-LD routing is specific to the technology used within an 
LD and is independent of the routing scheme used for Inter-LD 
routing on the Node ID level. It will therefore not be further dis-
cussed in this paper. 
2.2.1 Inter-LD Routing Approach 
Inter-LD NID routing using flat NIFT labels creates a poten-
tially very large scaling problem. Routing for individual nodes 
using a flat namespace would either require registration with a 
central lookup service, or a global routing scheme for flat labels. 
The former is for many reasons infeasible. The latter has been 
investigated to some extent [14], but there is not a clear solution 
that we want to depend on. 
 
Figure 1: Topology Assumption and Routing Overview 
To limit the scalability problem, we assume that there will be 
a core LD, which is rather static. The core LD can be compared to 
the current IPv4 backbone. Other LDs then attach in smaller to-
pologies at the edges of this core LD, forming tree-like structures 
hanging off the core. This assumption is motivated by that dy-
namicity – such as frequent (node or network) mobility and rout-
ing changes – is mostly expected to happen at the edges of the 
topology. 
With this assumption, inter-LD routing is then addressed by 
separating the global routing into three parts as illustrated in 
Figure 1: 
1. Routing up the edge trees towards the core-LD 
2. Routing through the core-LD 













2.2.2 Routing in the edges 
Part 1 – routing up the edges towards the core-LD – is using 
default routing. Default routes are installed when connecting net-
works, similar to the installation of default IP gateways in IP net-
works. 
Part 3 – routing from the core-LD down the trees towards the 
edge – is solved by a registration-based approach. Every node 
needs to register its presence along a default route to the core-LD, 
thus installing the routing information for the reverse path. As-
suming that edge networks are not too large, this scales as any NR 
only needs to hold registration information for nodes within the 
edge network, which it connects towards the core-LD, and not for 
all nodes. 
This registration procedure is really a simple routing proto-
col, since it establishes routing state. As a side comment, more 
advanced routing schemes can be applied to for instance enable 
larger edge structures or providing short-cuts in the edge topolo-
gies [20]. Also different protocols can be deployed in different 
edges implementing capability awareness, multi-path routing, or 
other more advanced features. 
2.2.3 Routing Through the Core – The Routing Hint 
One solution to routing over the core LD is to have a global 
database, or lookup service, which provides the mapping from 
NIFT to locator. We however do not want to depend on such an 
assumption. Instead, we introduce the notion of a routing hint. It 
is similar to a partial source route. It has to be specified by the 
source node in the packets it is sending. When a NID router does 
not have any matching routing information for a packet, including 
a default route, it makes use of the routing hint. 
Figure 2 illustrates how a packet is routed from node A to 
node B through the core locator domain. Part 1 uses default rout-
ing, and part 3 uses routing state established with registration, as 
described above. When the packet arrives to NR1, there is no 
information in its routing table for the destination (not even a 
default route). NR1 therefore looks at the routing hint, finds the 
locator of NR2, and forwards the packet to NR2. 
For the return path there are two options. Either node A 
specifies its routing hint in the packet (source hint), or NR1 in-
serts itself as source hint when deciding to use the destination hint 
in the packet. The options do not make a big difference in this 
simple example, but for instance has consequences for location 
privacy. 
 
Figure 2: Routing through the core with the routing hint 
It is most convenient to let the routing hint be a locator (IP 
address). That does not require any additional machinery. It could 
however be useful to let the routing hint also be a flat label with 
the same format as a NIFT, especially in combination with a more 
advanced routing protocol for edge trees. 
Please note that not necessarily all three parts need to be used 
to route a packet from source to destination. For example, if 
source and destination are within the same edge network, there is 
no need to route the packet to the core-LD. In general, routing 
towards the core-LD is only necessary if a NR does not hold any 
more specific routing information for the destination. Otherwise, 
it should use the more specific information and route directly 
towards the destination. 
The intention is that the destination routing hint is looked up 
in the DNS together with the destination NIFT. The DNS service 
therefore needs to be relayed down the edge LD trees without 
depending on NID routing. That can for instance be done by co-
locating query forwarding DNS servers with the NID routers. 
The routing hint serves as a generic indirection mechanism 
that can be used for many purposes. We will later see how it can 
be used to support mobility and multi-homing. 
2.2.4 Detailed Example 
Figure 3 presents the sample topology from Figure 2 with 
more details. It shows one core LD (LD1), which can be com-
pared to the current IPv4 backbone, as explained above. There are 
two LDs (LD2 and LD4) that are attached to the core LD through 
NR2 and NR3. On a third-level in the LD-topology there is LD3 
attached to LD2 through NR1 as well as LD5 and LD6 that are 
attached to LD2 through NR4 and NR5. The various LDs use 
different internal addressing schemes, e.g. IPv4 and IPv6, global 
and local addresses. 
In addition, there is a number of nodes present that are not 
acting as NRs (nodes A to K). However, some of these nodes can 
still act as internal routers for their respective LDs. In Figure 3, 
the nodes C, D, E, F and G act as IP routers, but not as NRs. 
 
 
Figure 3: Detailed Sample Topology 
Nodes within one LD, as described before, can directly 
communicate using the LD internal addressing and routing 
scheme. As an example, in the above figure node A can directly 
talk to NR1 using the LD-internal routing and addressing scheme. 
All nodes need to register their NIFT along a default path of NRs 
to the core LD. For example, node A needs to register at NR1 and 
NR2, while node K needs to register at NR5 and NR3. NR2 be-
comes the core NR responsible for node A and NR3 becomes the 

















As a complete example for communication establishment, if 
node A in Figure 1 wants to contact node K, the following actions 
need to be performed: 
1. A sends a request to the global naming system (NS) to 
resolve the FQDN for K. This query returns K's NIFT 
and K's routing hint (i.e. NR3, as it connects K’s edge 
network to the core LD). 
2. As A does not know where K is located it sends the 
packet to its default NR (NR1) using the LD3-internal 
IPv4 network. In addition to the normal IP header, the 
packet needs to contain K's NIFT and K's routing hint. 
3. NR1 as well does not hold any state about node K, re-
writes the IP header according to the LD2-internal IPv6 
locators and forwards the packet to its default NR 
(NR2). 
4. NR2 does not hold state about node K. NR2 – as being 
a core NR – does not have a default route and therefore 
reads K’s routing hint from the packet, which is NR3. 
5. NR2 rewrites the IP header according to the LD1-
internal IPv4 locators and forwards the packet to NR3. 
6. NR3 knows from the registration information that K can 
be reached via NR5, rewrites the IP header to the LD4-
internal IPv4 locators and forwards the packet to NR5. 
7. NR5 knows from the registration information that node 
K is in its local LD, rewrites the IP header to the LD6-
internal IPv6 locators and finally delivers the packet to 
node K. 
2.3 Multi-Homing and Mobility 
The NodeID architecture is designed with mobility and 
multi-homing in mind from the start. Mobility and multi-homing 
are supported directly by the routing capabilities of the NodeID 
overlay. No special concept of mobile IP home agent or HIP ren-
dezvous server is needed. Any NID router can instead take on this 
role for a particular node or network. By organizing NID routers 
in a hierarchy, mobility signaling can be localized as needed, and 
mobility signaling can be aggregated as needed. 
The already described routing hint plays an important role 
for mobility by providing a simple and effective mechanism for 
routing to a mobility anchor point for a node. The routing hint 
relieves the name resolution system from having to support up-
dates due to mobility. 
 
 
Figure 4: Node mobility using NID router as home agent 
Figure 4 illustrates node mobility using a NID router as home 
agent. Node A moves from LD1, where it previously registered, to 
LD2. In LD2, A registers recursively (1 & 2) until old registration 
state is encountered (NR3 in this case, which acts as the home 
agent for A). This procedure localizes mobility signaling to the 
part of the network affected by the mobility event. (3) At the point 
where the old registration state is encountered, de-registration is 




Figure 5: Network mobility 
Network mobility is only slightly more complex. Figure 5 il-
lustrates how network mobility is realized using another level of 
indirection. The NID router NR1 moves from one location to 
another as follows: (1) NR1 registers with its home agent, NR2. 
(2) Node A registers recursively to its home agent NR3. This path 
goes through NR1s home agent. When NR1 moves together with 
its network LD1, only NR1 needs to re-register (3) with its home 
agent. 
A common problem of many mobility schemes using the 
concept of a home agent is that routing may become very ineffi-
cient. The NodeID forwarding mechanism therefore has a route 
redirect function. A NID router detecting that the next hop is in 
the same locator domain as the previous hop in the forwarding 
path can issue a route redirect message to the previous hop with 
information about a more direct route. This function is in princi-
ple very similar to ICMP route redirect for IP. The cryptographic 
node identities however make it possible to provide route redirect 
securely by a sender signature and a return routability check. 
Multi-homing is supported by allowing multiple routing en-
tries for the same destination, each entry representing one of the 
options for reaching the destination. The multiple routing entries 
can be held at one or several multi-homing anchor points, and/or 
show up as multiple routing hints. In the former case, the path 
selection control stays with the multi-homed node/network, while 
in the latter case, the correspondent node has the option to choose 
path. The route redirect function can also be useful to control the 
path taken. 
2.4 Security Features 
The use of cryptographic identifiers naturally enable a set of 
security features built-in from ground up in the architecture. Bind-
ing these identifiers to persons or organizations is however out of 
scope of this paper. The registration and de-registration is authen-
ticated, and therefore the authorization of a node to register is 
based on the local polices applied in a locator domain and along 
the path up to the core. The authorization basically means a node 
is reachable through a certain NID router.  
For incoming traffic at each NID router, the source is authen-
ticated if required (again a policy decision). When the authentica-
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pass traffic or block traffic. This allows at any place to fend off 
unwanted traffic. Naturally, the policy engine need to know about 
the sources allowed on a per-routing hint or on a per-node basis. 
So the known prefix based firewall rules are not possible any-
more, but the source of the traffic is proven and can be checked 
back (address spoofing attacks are not possible anymore). Rule 
aggregation can instead be done on a certificate authority basis. 
Based on those basic features more complex overlays for security 
management can be built and maintained.  
Location privacy is enabled to a certain degree. When a node 
communicates within an LD, no privacy is achieved. Across LDs 
location privacy is given to the degree the routing hint does tell 
something about the location, or path to the location. When a 
home agent NR is used, that home agent can decide whether to 
conceal the location or reveal it via the route redirect function 
mentioned above. Since there is no restriction in the number of 
NIDs a node can have, location privacy can be achieved through 
multiple NIDs. 
3. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
The previous section has presented the general design of the 
NodeID architecture. In the following, we discuss a set of imple-
mentation specific issues that should get considered when instan-
tiating the architecture. 
3.1 Stateful vs. stateless (connection/session 
state) 
So far in this paper, the forwarding of data packets in the 
NodeID architecture has been described assuming a connec-
tionless paradigm, that is, each data packet is individually for-
warded by NID routers using a NID routing table. This approach 
introduces a quite large packet size overhead due to the additional 
packet headers required for NIFTs and routing hints. The advan-
tage is that the NID routers do not need to store session state for 
ongoing communication. 
The alternative is to introduce a session set-up step in which 
the NID routing takes place, and where subsequent packet for-
warding then uses a more efficient session state. An example of 
this approach is the HIP base exchange [4] together with SPINAT 
[19] which use the IPsec SPI values, established during the base 
exchange, to forward the data packets. The advantage of this ap-
proach is that the packet header overhead is much smaller com-
pared to the connectionless approach, since the large NIFTs and 
routing hints are only needed as part of the session set-up. The 
disadvantages are that the explicit signaling adds latency before 
communication commences, that the NID routers have to store the 
session state, resulting in a potential scalability problem, and that 
changes in routing, e.g., due to mobility, requires updating all 
session state in addition to changing the NID routing tables. How-
ever, when secure communication is required this overhead is 
required anyway. 
3.2 Iterative vs. Recursive NID Registration 
A node that wants to be globally reachable needs to register 
its NID along a set of NRs from its own LD towards the core LD. 
This registration follows a default route to the core, and builds the 
route from the core NR to the node in its local LD. The way NID 
registration is performed can be designed in a number of ways: 
recursive, iterative or in a mixed version. The details are discussed 
in the following. 
In recursive operation, a node sends a registration request to 
its local (first hop) NR and waits for a response. The local NR is 
then in charge of registering the node further towards the core LD 
on behalf of the node. The NRs should wait with sending a re-
sponse until they have received their responses to forwarded re-
quests, to inform the registering node about success or failure of 
the registration process.  
The advantage of recursive operation is that the node only 
needs to know or find a local NR.  Additionally, the scheme 
minimizes message round-trips. In recursive operation however, 
the NRs need to perform registrations on behalf of other nodes. 
First, this implies that, the nodes cannot influence where they get 
registered on the path towards the core. Second, the NR must get 
authorized through some mechanism that it can register another 
node. 
In iterative operation, a node that wants to be globally reach-
able registers its NID along a path towards the core LD one step at 
a time. It needs to send one request after the other to each in-
volved NR and receives an appropriate response. Optionally, if 
there is no other lookup system for NRs available to find the right 
NRs, the response can include the (or a set of potential) next hop 
NR that needs to be contacted . 
While the round-trip time for a full registration in iterative 
operation increases compared to the recursive operation, the it-
erative operation has different security properties and gives much 
more control of the path creation process to the end nodes - a 
node can directly decide at which NRs it wants to get registered if 
there are multiple available. As the node registers itself, it can 
directly use its own key material to register at NRs. If the security 
credentials of the registering nodes are to be used for the registra-
tion process in general (e.g. within organizations), then the itera-
tive operation does not need an additional authorization mecha-
nism to enable the NRs to carry out subsequent registrations on 
behalf of the registering nodes. 
Since the registration defines the path from the core to this 
node to a certain degree, the recursive operation requires the net-
work to make routing decisions on behalf of the end-system. On 
the other hand, the iterative operation allows nodes to influence 
the path to its needs. In both cases, certain capabilities of the path 
can be taken into account. 
In mixed operation, the benefits of recursive and iterative 
operation can be weighed against each other according to the 
respective environment. A node may for example use iterative 
operation for the first few hops, but then the last hops could be 
done in recursive operation. 
The operation mode of the registration could also be influ-
enced by the underlying business models. As an example, a cus-
tomer network might want to have explicit control on which path 
to register to its provider, but the provider might want to have 
control on how to further register the customer globally. 
3.3 Usage of the Host Identity Protocol as Ba-
sis 
There are several similarities between the Node Identity Architec-
ture and The Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Architecture [4], in-
cluding the separation of identifier and locator and the use of 
cryptographic identifiers as the basis for security.  Also, since 
several implementations have been developed and are available 
HIP was a good starting point for a prototype implementation of 
our architecture. 
The HIP Architecture decouples the dual use of IP addresses as 
locators and identifiers by introducing a new Host Identity name-
space. Instead of using the IP address as end-point identifier each 
HIP-enabled host has a Host Identity(HI) on which the transport 
layer operates. The Host Identities a self-generated cryptographic 
public key. It also has a 128-bit Host Identity Tag (HIT) represen-
tation. The HIP protocol is a key exchange protocol used to estab-
lish communications context and IPsec Security Associations 
between hosts. However, HIP works end-to-end, which requires 
several changes and extensions (mentioned below) in order to 
implement the NodeID architecture. 
4. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION 
We have implemented a small scale prototype of the NodeID 
internetworking architecture. The prototype was built in order to 
show how the more abstract concepts and guidelines in the archi-
tecture could be implemented, to force the details of the basic 
internetworking mechanisms to be ironed out, and to investigate 
the feasibility of the architecture on a small scale.  
The prototype was built based on the hip4inter.net code base 
[3]. We have added internetworking functionality that consists of 










































Figure 6: Prototyping Overview 
 As shown in Figure 6 the prototype consists of NID clients 
and NID routers. NID clients register to their local NID router to 
get reachable and the registration is done recursively up to the 
core. NID routers forward packets based on NIDs and act as gate-
ways between locator domains. In the prototype we use the differ-
ent IPv4 and IPv6 address ranges as locator domains. NID routers 
have a table of local NIDs that is populated when nodes register 
and they have a default route up towards the core.  
In the prototype we implement the stateful version of the 
NodeID architecture where forwarding state is set up in all NID 
routers on the path between two communicating nodes. After the 
initial signaling, packets are forwarded based on Security Parame-
ter Index (SPI)-labels and no NIFTs need to be included in the 
packets. 
4.1 NID Registration Protocol 
A node that bootstraps or enters a new locator domain has to reg-
ister its NID with a local NR and every other NR along a default 
path up to the core until the registration reaches the node’s home 
NR (HNR). In the prototype, we implemented the registration 
protocol in a recursive manner. A node registers its NID with the 
local NR and with that also orders the local NR to propagate the 
registration up the default path towards the HNR. The registration 
protocol needs two basic messages, the request for registration 
and a corresponding response. The prototype defines a new HIP 
control packet type NID_UPDATE to carry all NID-related pa-
rameters and reusing the HIP association. Afterwards it sends a 
registration request, which is recursively forwarded up to the 
home NID router. Once all responses have returned, the node is 
fully registered at all NRs up to the HNR. 
4.2 NID Routing 
In the prototype a NID router has tables of local NIDs that 
have registered and a default route up towards the core. It has a 
NID routing table that maps destination NID to next-hop NID and 
then a table that maps next-hop NID to a corresponding locator. 
This second step could have been done through a NID ARP-like 
mechanism as well (finding a router with a certain NID based on a 
locator), but by using HIP as the prototype basis the mapping 
from NID to locator is already managed by the HIP associations 
and can be re-used. 
The routing hint is not implemented into the protocols, in-
stead we use for the tests described below a single core LD router 
(NR2 in Figure 7). The algorithm on the NID router is still the 
same, just that in case, the NID is unknown and there is no default 
route (core NID router), the routing hint is used to find the next 
hop. 
In the prototype, the NID routers set up and keep state for 
ongoing communication (following the stateful variant of the 
NodeID architecture). This can be seen as an optimization where 
the NIFTs only need to be included in the signaling packets, but 
not in the data packets. Instead, the Security Parameter Index 
(SPI) values are used as labels for forwarding packets in an end-
to-end session. When two nodes want to communicate they first 
do a NID signaling exchange, similar to the HIP base exchange, 
that establishes the end-to-end security association. The four 
packets that form the HIP base exchange are forwarded in the NID 
routers by looking up the destination NIFT in the routing tables. 
In addition to looking up the destination NIFT, the NID routers 
on the path also look in the packets and learn the SPI values that 
are exchanged and use these to initialize the forwarding state. 
After the base exchange, no NIFTs are needed in the data packets. 
Instead the SPI values in the IPsec packets are used for forward-
ing. This forwarding functionality was implemented based on the 
existing SPINAT - Security Parameter Index (SPI) multiplexed 
Network Address Translation (NAT) [19]. The control code for 
SPINAT has been exchanged such that a NID client is addressing 
the NID router explicitly (know locator). Then the NID router 
uses the NID routing table for making the forwarding decision and 
it configures the decision what path the following packet follow 
into SPINAT.  
4.3 Prototype performance 
In order to verify that the prototype works as expected and to 
do a small scale evaluation of the architecture we measured the 
round-trip time and the control overhead in a simple experimental 
set-up as shown in Figure 7. Here we have two nodes A and B 
communicating with a varying number of NID routers in between. 
The NID routers are standard HP PCs equipped with 2 GHz Ath-
lon CPUs and Broadcom BCM5750A1 Gigabit Ethernet adapters. 
The nodes A and B are standard DELL PCs with 2.8GHz Pentium 
4 CPUs and Intel EtherExpress 82801EB/ER PRO/100 Ethernet 
network adapters.  
Figure 8 shows the results of measuring the NID routing 
overhead once the forwarding state has been established and pack-
ets are forwarded based on the SPIs in the packets. Here we are 
sending minimal sized ICMP packets between the two nodes A 
and B via a varying number of NID routers. When the number of 
hops is equal to one the nodes are talking directly to each other.  
With a number of hops equal to four there are three NID routers 







Figure 7: Experimental Setup 
 
For reference we have included the point "ICMP 1 HOP" 
where the nodes are communicating directly without using HIP. 
As can be seen from the diagram (1 hop) HIP introduces an over-
head of 0.1ms for a minimal sized packet. Each additional router 
contributes with an additional delay of roughly 0.25ms. As ex-
pected, the overhead grows linearly with the number of hops. All 
measurements were repeated 100 times and the standard devia-



























Figure 8: NID Routing Overhead 
 
In  Figure 9 we plot the same thing but for three different 
packet sizes, full sized Ethernet (1500 bytes), half sized Ethernet, 
and minimal. As can be seen from the differences in slope of the 
curves, the router overhead increases only marginally with full 
sized packets (0.1ms per router). This is to be expected since 
packets are not cryptographically processed by routers, only by 
endpoints. However, if we look at the 1 hop case we find that the 
cryptographic overhead goes up by 0.6ms when full sized packets 

























Figure 9: NID Routing Overhead for Different Packet Sizes 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
The previous sections have introduced the ingredients of the 
Node Identity Internetworking architecture. In this section, we 
discuss implications of various design choices and present some 
experiences gained while implementing the prototype. 
5.1 Achieving the goals for a Future Internet 
Architecture 
Bridging heterogeneous networks with middleboxes being 
first-order citizens 
Those heterogeneous networks are represented as locator 
domains (LDs) in the internetworking framework. They can em-
ploy different networking technologies and are in that respect 
fairly autonomous. Global reachability is achieved with NID 
routers at LD borders, which inject routing information. These 
middle-boxes install state according to registrations they receive. 
In that respect they are not hidden from nodes as NAT-boxes are 
for example, introducing well-known problems. In other words, 
NID routers are first-order citizens that do not introduce such 
issues as introduced by NAT- and firewall-boxes. Note however, 
that after reachability is established, data plane traffic can be send 
without having to worry about or explicitly address these middle-
boxes. 
Not introducing a large set of new components including 
managed name-spaces 
The NodeID Internetworking Architecture uses existing 
technology when possible. For example, the technology used 
within an LD could be plain IPv4 or IPv6. The initial name reso-
lution can be done using DNS after implementing appropriate 
resource records for NIDs and routing hints. Newly introduced is 
the NodeID namespace. It is however self-managed, since it is 
based on self-generated cryptographic material, which is statisti-
cally unique. Where there is need for, obviously the ID could be 
based on managed IDs, but the architecture does not mandate such 
management. There is only one entirely new type of component 
introduced using the NodeID architecture: the NID router. 
Overcoming migration obstacles by allowing partial de-
ployment while already providing sufficient benefits for early 
adopters 
As the NodeID architecture does not mandate a global adop-
tion of the routing functionality, partial deployment is feasible. As 
has been mentioned, today’s Internet could serve as the core net-
work, requiring no change to today’s Internet routing substrate. 
To facilitate incremental deployment, NID routers serving as 
home agents can also act as Mobile IP home agents. The benefits 
for early adopters are increased security and autonomy from other 
networks allowing realizing efficient multi-homing and support-
ing mobility for end-hosts and networks in an integrated fashion. 
Always-on security including basic protection against de-
nial of service attacks, encryption, authentication, and some 
form of location privacy 
As node and network identities are based on cryptographic 
material basic privacy, authentication and encryption mechanisms 
can be implemented as an intrinsic part of the internetworking 
functionality. With the registration process in place, and addi-
tional mechanisms such as requiring end nodes to solve computa-
tionally expensive puzzles during registration, DoS attacks can be 
mitigated. In addition, as locators lose their global meaning a form 
of location privacy is implemented. The routing hint, serving to 
some degree as an indirection point further strengthens the loca-
tion privacy property. 
Native support for multi-homing, node and network mo-
bility 
Using a routing hint, the NodeID architecture has a built-in 
mobility anchor that removes the need for an add-on global mo-
bility mechanism. Multi-homing is realized using NodeIDs (node 
multi-homing) and routing hints (network multi-homing) instead 
of locators, making it possible to implement multi-homing much 
more efficiently compared to the mechanisms at hand today.  
Scalability 
Unstructured NIDs or NIFTs might have scalability problems 
for global networks, or at least add costs to core network equip-
ment in terms of routing table size and lookup speed. [16] shows 
results for a similar architecture doing routing based on NIDs 
only. Then work models the today's Internet with a core locator 
domain and 5 levels in the trees hanging off the core, and the 
current existing amount of nodes. In that setting, the full knowl-
edge of all nodes in the core LD is needed, and we could expect 
roughly 20 million lookups per second (based on today's traffic 
characteristics and estimations). Therefore the routing hint was 
introduced, which allows distributing the core network state. The 
architecture is flexible enough to tradeoff the cost for mobility 
across different trees and the level of aggregation, depending on 
the specifics of the routing hint.  
 
5.2 Experience with a HIP-based Instantia-
tion of the Architecture 
Using HIP as a building block gives the flat unstructured 
identity space and the separation of node identity and location 
prescribed in the architecture. HIP also provides the basic end-to-
end security with cryptographic identifiers, host authentication 
and encrypted communication. Implementation-wise the HIP code 
base provides easy access to the NodeID prototype from all types 
of applications through a socket API. For example, the NodeID 
implementation has been used as a base networking platform for a 
peer-to-peer SIP prototype and for applications written using a 
SOAP platform. 
Adding NID registration and NID routing to this as described 
in section 4 gives a mechanism for bridging between locator do-
mains. In the following, we describe a few limitations and issues 
that arose while implementing one possible instantiation of the 
Node Identity Internetworking architecture. 
A first limitation in the HIP-based prototype implementation 
compared to the architecture definition is that it does not allow 
neighboring locator domains to have overlapping address spaces. 
A NID router can only handle the attached locator domains if they 
have non-overlapping addresses spaces. However the same ad-
dress space may be used in different locator domains if they are 
not directly connected to each other. To fully support the co-
existence and cooperation of independent locator domains as de-
scribed in the architecture more functionality is needed in a NID 
router to be able to differentiate IP packets that come from the 
same IP-address but from different locator domains through dif-
ferent network interfaces. Basically, a NID router would need to 
maintain multiple IP routing tables instead of a single one - one 
per connected locator domain. Note however that this is a general 
limitation present in most of today’s operating systems and is not 
related to using HIP as a code base. 
A second limitation with the current prototype is specific to 
using HIP for instantiating the architecture because HIP was de-
signed as an end-to-end protocol. When a host moves or changes 
its locator in HIP it always signals the change to all its current 
peers, because HIP assumes an end-to-end, globally routable net-
work layer underneath. However, in the Node Identity Internet-
working architecture movements do not need necessarily need to 
be advertised to all peers. On the contrary, a locator has no mean-
ing for a node in another locator domain, thus, it should not be 
advertised to any peer outside a node’s own locator domain. 
A technical consideration that came up during implementa-
tion concerns node registration. For a node to register at a NID 
router we defined a new HIP control packet type NID_UPDATE 
to carry all registration-related parameters. Previous work by 
Laganier et al. [18] already proposes a generic registration exten-
sion to HIP. Unfortunately, it is mainly designed to register a 
requester at a registrar and does not support recursive operation, 
i.e. the node sending the request must be the node to be registered. 
Therefore, the proposed extension was not suitable for the recur-
sive NID registration. A recursive registration scheme should also 
be protected through some sort of control delegation, i.e. a node 
must authorize its NID routers to send registration requests on 
behalf of it. This can e.g. be done by providing authorization cer-
tificates to the NRs [17]. However, due to HIP packet size limita-
tion, it is not possible to send the required certificates inside the 
HIP control packets and the mechanism is therefore not yet im-
plemented. 
Another technical issue with the current prototype implemen-
tation is the possibility of SPI collisions at NID routers. The for-
warding at NID routers is based on the SPI values exchanged 
during the HIP base exchange as described in Section 4.2. Since 
SPI values are negotiated between the end-nodes only, two differ-
ent communication pairs could choose the same SPI values to be 
used for their communication. Thus, if the communication path is 
overlapping, the NID routers would not be able to multiplex the 
communications based on the SPI values. One possible solution 
that was not further investigated during implementation would be 
to rewrite the SPI values at NID routers during the base exchange 
between the end-nodes – similar to the way NATs rewrite port 
numbers today. 
 
6. RELATED WORK 
The separation of identity and location is fundamental in the 
Node Identity Architecture and so also in many other proposed 
architectures including FARA [7], the Layered Naming Architec-
ture [21] and DOA [22], the NAT-based architectures TRIAD [9] 
and IPNL [23], in TurfNet [27] and in the Split Nam-
ing/Forwarding Architecture (SNF) [24]. 
There are also several proposals in the IETF and IRTF that 
use the idea of locator/identity split. There are host-based propos-
als like HIP [4] and shim6 [26] and router-based solutions such as 
LISP [5] and Six/One [25]. 
The proposals differ for instance in how the identifiers are 
defined. HIP introduces unstructured cryptographic identifiers and 
is in this sense the work most similar to ours. The Layered Nam-
ing Architecture and DOA also propose the use of topology-
independent endpoint identifiers from a flat namespace while in 
TRIAD and IPNL domain names (FQDNs) are used as identifiers.  
The more incremental solutions Shim6, LISP and Six/One, 
don't fully separate the identifier and locator functions but use IP 
addresses (or parts of IP addresses) also as identifiers. LISP di-
vides IP-addresses into endpoint identifiers and routing locators. 
A host is unaware of the latter which is used as transit address 
when tunneling between networks providers. The tunnels in LISP 
can in NodeID instead be implemented with NID routing and the 
routing hint. The “originally from/to” header option in Six/One 
can be compared to the NodeID routing hint, in that both provide 
routing information in the packet itself. 
In the NodeID Architecture we also do forwarding and inter-
domain routing on the NodeIDs to bridge between locator do-
mains. Also, the NodeID Architecture provides improved security 
features based on cryptographic identifiers, which is not a focus of 
most of the works mentioned above. 
Many registration and lookup mechanisms for flat name 
spaces have been proposed, mainly using DHTs. However, for 
inter-LD registration and lookup, DHTs may not be appropriate, 
because NodeID sets up inter-domain communication during the 
registration and lookup process. This can create additional de-
pendencies between neighboring domains to use the same DHT 
type and protocol. On the other hand, DHTs can provide scalable 
and fault-tolerant intra-domain name resolution services. ROFL 
[14] proposes such a DHT-based inter-domain routing scheme 
based on a flat name space. However, it relies on a new, globally 
deployed internetwork protocol, whereas NodeID uses translation 
gateways between different local network protocols. Additionally, 
ROFL assumes consistency between the operation of the intra-
domain and inter-domain routing schemes, whereas NodeID fully 
decouples intra- and inter-domain routing and forwarding 
schemes. 
Traditional inter-domain routing mechanisms, such as BGP, 
operate on structured address spaces and static topologies. Be-
cause support for node and network mobility is a first-order re-
quirement of NodeID, pre-establishment of routing paths is prob-
lematic; dynamic establishment of routing paths can have distinct 
advantages. In the area of geographic routing, various location 
service schemes have been proposed and classified [15]. NodeID 
is most similar to hierarchical schemes [13], except that the loca-
tion service of a LD operates on non-geographic locators and 
defines routes during next hop inter-domain lookup. Finally, in 
the area of ad-hoc routing, many research proposals have concepts 
that are similar to NodeID. However, all of them focus on homo-
geneous networks that are much smaller than a global internet-
work, and therefore they are typically only applicable at the edge 
of the network. 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
We have presented the NodeID architecture as a solution to 
some of the challenges faced by the Internet’s infrastructure. The 
two-layer routing model, where the new second layer performs 
routing on flat node identifiers, relieves the current IP routing 
from dealing with node and network mobility and multi-homing, 
as well as basic security functions. With this separation, the IP 
layer can continue to focus on providing high performance packet 
forwarding. The more advanced functions are instead provided by 
the new node identity layer. 
The two-level routing also enables Internetworking over mul-
tiple technologies, such as IPv4 and IPv6, and multiple addressing 
domains, for example private and public address spaces. Node 
identity routers take over the role NATs have today, making them 
an intrinsic part of the architecture. Work is also ongoing to sup-
port multiple core networks of different kinds, enabling seamless 
interoperation of the global IPv4 and IPv6 Internet. 
The NodeID routing scheme based on default routing and 
registration described in this paper serves as a working example. 
The NodeID basic forwarding mechanism, including the routing 
hint, allows other, more advanced, routing protocols, just like the 
IP forwarding mechanism does. Protocols that can handle larger 
edge structures were for instance designed as part of the Ambient 
Networks project. Work was also done on replacing the current 
interdomain routing with a BGP-like protocol that is using locator 
domain identifiers instead of AS numbers. 
The implementation of the prototype evaluated the feasibility 
through the proof of concept and showed good performance in a 
small network. Also it integrates well with various types of appli-
cation and overlay networks running on top of the NodeID archi-
tecture. However, for evaluating the concepts in large to very 
large scale analytical work is required, specifically scaling the 
system up towards a network of information containing informa-
tion elements in the range of trillions of elements accessible glob-
ally. 
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